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105, 273 N.W. 725 (1937). It was held a prejudicial error to instruct the jury
to apply the adult rule to a thirteen year old plaintiff, who was struck by an
automobile. Quinn v. Ross Motor Car Co., 157 Wis. 543, 147 N.W. 1000 (1914).
Wisconsin does not apply the criminal law presumption that a child under
seven is conclusively incapable of blameworthy conduct. De Groot v. Van
Akkeren, 225 Wis. 105, 273 N.W. 725 (1937). However, a child of one, two,
and three years respectively, are conclusively presumed to be incapable of con-
tributory negligence. Le May v. City of Oconto, 229 Wis. 65, 281 N.W. 688
(1938); O'Brien v. Wis. Central Ry. Co., 119 Wis. 7, 96 N.W. 424 (1903);
Pisarek v. Singer Talking Machine Co., 185 Wis. 92, 200 N.W. 675 (1924).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a child of five may be capable of
contributory negligence, although the plaintiff in the case was found conclusively
incapable of contributory negligence. Ruka v. Zierer, 195 Wis. 285, 218 N.W. 358
(1928). Children of six and seven years, respectively, may be found guilty of
contributory negligence. De Groot v. Van Akkeren, 225 Wis. 105, 273 N.W.
725 (1937) ; Mueller v. O'Leary, 216 Wis. 585, 257 N.W. 161 (1935).
ALVIN M. BRUSS.
Torts-Negligence--Duty of Swimming Pool Operators.-Plaintiff's eleven
year old son went to defendant's pool to swim. He was with a 4-H Club group
under the supervision of two Red Cross swimming instructors. There was
present a third lifeguard employed by the defendant. The boy drowned. Plain-
tiff charged negligence on the part of the defendant for 1) failing to prevent
deceased from entering the pool ahead of the rest of the group, 2) failing to
give personal notice of the depth of the water to the deceased, 3) failing to
ascertain if deceased could swim before permitting him to enter the pool,
4) failing to employ enough lifeguards to discover the disappearance of the boy
in time to prevent his drowning. There was a directed verdict for the
defendant.
Held: judgment affirmed, since as to point 1) there was no duty resting
on the defendant with respect to the care of the swimmers because they were
accompanied by two Red Cross life guards; as to point 2) there was no duty
to give personal notice of the depth of the water, because the depth was
clearly marked on the sides of the pool and the danger was obvious; as to
point 3) there was no negligence in failing to ascertain that the decedent could
not swim, because it would not have been the defendant's duty to keep him out
of the water; and as to point 4) there was no causal connection between the
drowning and the failure to provide more guards since none of the other 150
swimmers noticed the decedent's disappearance. Hecht v. Des Moines Playground
and Recreation Association, (Iowa 1939) 287 N.W. 259.
The operator of a swimming pool is not an insurer of his patron's safety
but owes only reasonable care to provide for his safety. Sistrunk v. Audubon
Park Natatorium, Inc., (La. 1935) 164 So. 667. What constitutes reasonable care
depends on the circumstances in each case. Nordgren v. Strong, 110 Conn. 593,
149 Atl. 201 (1930). A Nebraska case, where the deceased went to defendant's
pool under the supervision of Boy Scout swimming instructors, held that defend-
ant's duty was fulfilled when a sufficient number of guards was supplied. Who
supplied the guards was held to be immaterial. Nolan v. Y.M.C.A., 123 Neb. 549,
234 N.W. 639 (1932). This holding in effect states that the operator of a swim-
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ming pool can delegate to another his duty to supply reasonable protection for
his patrons. However, in most instances the courts follow the doctrine that the
duty of the operator of a public place, to exercise reasonable care to see that
the premises are safe for business visitors coming upon them, cannot be dele-
gated to another. Where a customer was injured by the collapse of the seats
in the concession of a sub-concessioner of a carnival company, it was held that
the carnival company was liable since it retained the right to supervise and
control the entire premises. Rubin & Cherry Shows v. Dinsmore, 88 Ind. App.
616, 164 N.E. 304 (1928). Where a city hired an independent contractor to repair
the lights in a park, and a child was injured by falling into an open ditch left
by the contractor, the city was held liable, not for the negligence of the contrac-
tor, but for its own negligence in failing to have the premises in a reasonably
safe condition for persons coming upon them. Lewis v. Kansas City, (Mo. 1938)
122 S.W. (2d) 852.
However many of the swimming pool cases seem to indicate that the pro-
prietor's duty is fulfilled when a sufficient number of guards is supplied. Even
where a drowning occurred in a pool while the lifeguard was in the locker
room attending to other duties the court said, "The duty of exercising ordinary
care required the defendant to provide an adequate degree of general supervi-
sion. The city performed its duty by furnishing a lifeguard, experienced and
competent." Curcio v. City of New York, 275 N.Y. 20, 9 N.E. (2d) 760 (1937).
But there are holdings contra. Where the decedent drowned in a pool while
one of the guards was giving diving lessons and a second guard was talking
to a girl it was held that the defendant was liable for the negligence of the
lifeguards. Lipton v. Dreamland Park Co., 121 N.J.L. 554, 3 A. (2d) 571 (1939).
Where the attendants in a theater upon discovering a fire fled without attempt-
ing to put it out and the plaintiff was injured in the resulting panic, the theater
operator was held liable. The court said that one who collects a large number
of persons for gain or profit must be vigilant to protect them. Topley v. Ross
Theater Corp., 275 N.Y. 144, 9 N.E. (2d) 812 (1937). Under these holdings the
defendant's duty would be to supply lifeguards who would take all measures
reasonably necessary for the safety of the swimmers.
Louisiana raises the presumption of negligence if a person drowns in a
pool policed by lifeguards. The defendant must refute this presumption. Rome
v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, (La. 1936) 169 So. 132.
Contra: Mahr, Administrator v. Madison Square Gardens Corporation, 242 N.Y.
506, 152 N.E. 403 (1926). An Indiana case following the New York case dis-
tinguishes the Rome case on the ground that a contractual relationship arose
from the fact that in the Rome case the decedent paid an admission fee. In the
principal case the deceased paid an admission fee.
As to point (2) the proprietor of a swimming pool or beach need give
warning only of dangers not known to the patron or a person of ordinary intelli-
gence. Johnson v. Bauer, (Mass. 1935) 198 N.E. 739. The dangers of an open
body of water are obvious even to a child of very tender years. Polk v. Laurel
Hill Cemetery Ass'n., 37 Cal. App. 624, 174 Pac. 414 (1918); Avery v. Morse,
267 N.Y.S. 210, 149 Misc. 318 (1933).
It has been held that it is not negligence on the part of a swimming pool
proprietor to fail to determine whether a patron could or could not swim before
permitting him to enter the pool. Mullen v. Russworm, 169 Tenn. 650, 90 S.W.
(2d) 530 (1936). The court reasoned that under a contrary rule the ordinary
city boy would never learn to swim. This reasoning is fallacious in the face of
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the fact that many agencies, such as the Boy Scouts, Y.M.C.A., and municipal
social centers, hold classes to teach swimming to city youngsters. Had the life-
guard in the principal case known that the boy was unable to swim, he could
have kept a closer watch over him and probably prevented the drowning.
As to the holding in the principal case that there was no causal connection
between the drowning and the failure to have a greater number of lifeguards,
it would seem that reasonable men might well differ and that the question is
one for the jury. The court's reasoning that a larger number of guards would
not have caused decedent's drowning to be observed, since none of the other
swimmers noticed it, overlooks the fact that in a large group of this kind one
person is apt to be wholly unobserved by those around him who are likely to
be absorbed in their own activities. The lifeguard, on the other hand, should
be engaged exclusively in watching for swimmers who are in difficulty. How-
ever, the court's holding that three lifeguards were sufficient seems correct, not
for the reason which the court gave, but for the more obvious one that it would
hardly be reasonable to require the attendance of more than three lifeguards to
look after 150 swimmers. A jury verdict that two lifeguards were sufficient for
200 swimmers has been upheld. Mullen v. Russworm, supra.
GEORGE MANGAN.
